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CHAPTER I

Introduction

When an institutioh of culture long taken for
granted no longer fulfills the purpose for which it was
instituted, it is no longer taken for granted.

Recently

language has become the subject matter for numerous and
anxious: disquisitions which question, either wittingly or
unwittingly, its reliability.

Language, whose purpose of

institution is ostensibly that of conveying thought by means
of symbols, performs its function so imperfectly that it is
no longer a trustworthy instrument.

This, in brief, provides

our thesis with its point of departure.^

We should like to ask,

therefore; why does language in our culture fail to fulfill its
purpose?

And to answer, (since our question begins with ’why1)#

from the point of view of philosophy#
This paper is written in language;
plea for better, as Stuart Chase would say? ^

bad language in
Not necessarily.

Hie language, as our thesis proposes to show, depends on how
valid our plea is. The instrument is ruined by improper use#

1# Cf. infra pp# 16-21, for a differentiation of a philological
approach and a philosophical approach.
2# Cf. Stuart Chase, The Tyranny of Words (New York; Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1938) p. 17#
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We have just said that language has become the
subject matter of numerous and anxious disquisitions.

In

so saying we may have implied that the volume of literature
devoted to language is a sign of its defection} otherwise
it would be taken for granted.

However, it would be naive

to argue from these few observations that whenever there is
an unprecedented concern over the fate of a cultural insti
tution it is certainly defective.

The faet that an unpre

cedented volume of literature is devoted to language and its
problems may well be a sign of unprecedented interest in the
subject.

But there is another and morq^rofound explanation

which accounts for the appearance of so many books on language
and one which does not necessarily imply that the voluminous
discussion of it is a sign of its complete failure.

This

explanation shows that it is natural for language to reflect
upon its own history and its own nature,
begun to write her memoirs.

Clio, too, has

We have now 'histories of

history1,*' as well as histories of men and events.

Philosophy

has also reached the stage in its career where it can reflect
upon Itself.

It is not unreasonable to suppose, then, that

language could be interested in language, that we can have
words about words.

1. Cf. James T. Shotwell, A History of History (New Yorks
Columbia University Press, 1939)"*
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This phase in the development of language,
because it represents an advancement in the study of
language, should not be considered as a certain sign of
its deterioration.

Reflection, however, has the unfortunate

habit of taking its own movement for the first movement
which it presupposes.

We are familiar with this in philo

sophy and in the tragic part to which epistemology has
been brought by placing the cartesian cogito (a reflex
movement of the mind) at the beginning of philosophical
knowledge,

The advance which the study of language has

gained has been won at the acpense of losing its signifi
cation,

Thus, when language began to use words about

words, it forgot that words signified thoughts which in
turn signified things,

It remains now for language to

reestablish its liaison with thought and things.

This

done, it will emerge immeasurably enriched by reflexive
experience it has had, and will continue to have,-**
1, It is only on condition that we point out that human
language is possible by virtue of the power of reasoning .
that we are justified in drawing an analogy between philo
sophy and language and between their respective histories,
or for that matter between history and language. That man
should become conscious of the language he uses is perfectly
natural. That he should invent a 1somatic* language to
talk about language is also reasonable, for whenever there
is reflexive knowledge new concepts (reflexive) must make
this known to the mind. Language, no less than any other
human institution, obeys the progressive law of the human
mind of which M Mari tain writes: *Cette loi de la pro
gressive prise de conscience de soi-meme est une des
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This does not alter the fact, however, that
language in the concrete fails to do what it is supposed
to do*

Descriptions of the plight of contemporary users

of language abound.

Authors like Hayakawa, Korzybski, Lee

and Chase, to mention only a few of those engaged in trying
to solve the problem modern language has posed, are aware
of the difficulties involved in expressing their own
thoughts, as well as the total effect that the breakdown
of language has had on contemporary civilization,

The

perfection of so many techniques to facilitate communication,
from which we expected so much, rather facilitated misunder
standing among individuals and nations:
As this is being written the world is becoming daily
a worse madhouse of murder, hatred and destruction.
It would seem that the almost miraculous efficiency
achieved by modern instruments of communication should
enable nations to understand each other better and
co-operate more fully. But, as we know too well, the
opposite has been the casej the better the communi
cation, the bloodier the quarrels,
Techniques of communication have been perfected, and science
continues to introduce newer and more efficient means of
grandes lois du developpement historique de l'etre humain,
et elle se rapporte 4 une propriete des activites d 1ordre
spirituel, Le propre de 1'esprit est de pouvoir, disaient
les anciens, revenir entierement sur lui-meme, accomplir
une reflexion parfaite: l'essentiel ici n'etant pas le
repliement, mais la saisi, la penetration de soi par soi
qui lui est liee,» Situation de la Poesie (Paris: Desciee
de Brouwer et Cie, 1938) pp, 79“SO,
1, S. I, Hayakawa, Language in Action
Brace and Company, 1941)#
7

(New York: Hareourt,
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We have in mind here, not only the mechanical

devices that are instruments of language, but also the tech
niques within language itself.

This latter development, the

•semantic' approach, to language, reminds us immediately of
Korzybski,

But while the perfection of technique (for Kor

zybski a panacea'*') facilitates communication, making the world
smaller, as Professor Perry has so well demonstrated , no
real improvement is made until what is communicated is improved.

1. Despite what Alfred Korzybski claims: 'I must stress
that I give no panaceas, but experience shows that when the
methods of general semantics are applied, the results are
usually beneficial, whether in law, medicine, business, etc,,
education on all levels, or personal inter-relationships, be
they in family, national, or international fields.1 .Science
and Sanity (3rd edition, Lakeville, Connecticut.: The Inter
national Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company, 1948)
p. v,
Korzybski's practical techniques in the field of psy
chiatry have had some measure of success in World War II (loc,
cat.), but his general theory of language, which may be
described as mathematical and pragmatic, falls short of pro
viding a true explanation of language1as does any empiricist
doctrine that takes the effect for the cause, If, as Korzybski
says, we can lay a great deal of the trouble in the present day
world at the door of language, it is because language has been
vitiated by the same empiricism which never can comprehend the
causes, ('causes', not in his 'non-Aristotelian' sense, but
causes definitely in the Aristotelian and true sense), and by
which he proposes to reform language and with it the world,
• 2. Vide Ralph Barton Perry, One World in the Making (New York:
Current Books Inc., A.A.Wyn, Publishers, 1945)* Professor
Perry's work gives us an excellent description of what has
happened to man's spatial'consciousness .in
world which has
■ grown relatively smallerj in effect,. One V/orldp to use Wendell
-'Willkie's expression, (cf. p. 13).- There are-jp:-according to .
1Professor Perry, two 'fundamentally different meanings of -.
'^one‘
‘world’" (loc,cit,). The first- '■onehess' has.been 'brought
about mainly by scientific and technological ..changes' (ibid,
'p. 13). The second 'oneness' is not yet achieved. It is this
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A point is now easily made: no technique to facili
tate the means of communication will ever replace the intel
lectual power necessary to sustain it.

As St. Augustine

taught, knowledge is acquired by proceeding from sense data
to a knowledge of causes, by progressing from sigh to symbol
to the Truth,

It is impossible to terminate a searchfor

truth in symbols.

To make this clearer, let us say that if

a sign qua sign is itself known without means of another sign
it is no longer a sign but a thing.

three things are required

for knowledge! one, something to be known; two, a knower, and
three, the means of effecting a union of the known and the
knower. If the known is to be known, and not some substitute
for it, then the means by which the knower is united to the
known must in itself be unknown directly.

This means if the

concept, which is a pure sign whose essence is to reveal some
thing other than itself.

It is not therefore a representation

which itself can become an object of knowledge or a working
equivalent for the thing known.
the Middle Ages viewed the world as a sacramental

second 'oneftess* at which we should aim linguistically, poli
tically, and so forth, and which, while not guaranteed by the
unity achieved by science in the field of communication, could
he.'facilitated by it.
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The symbols created

by this era for its own culture reflected the sacramental
character of the time.

Today we have become adept at preser

ving these symbols, and have retained the liturgy of the
Middle Ages, at least materially.

But the tradition necessary

to sustain the formal significance of these symbols has been
broken:
Nous vivons en un temps et dans un milieu satur^s
d'idees chretiennes qui ne se souviennent plus de leurs
origines. On procede autour de nous, dans les domaines
les plus divers, A ce que Gabriel Marcel a si bien
defini: »une sorte de laicisation indue de notions
religieuses dans leur essence, mais dont le ressort
vital a ete en quelque sorte prealablement brise,• Des
notions comme celles de vie interieure, ou de vie
spirituelle, semblent devenues le bien commun de po&tes,
d'essayistes ou de philosophes qui, non contents d'en
faire librement usage, ce qui ne serait rien, pr&tendent
parfois eh deposseder la pensee chretienne, dont ils
les ont pourtant empruntees.
This secularization of which M Gilson speaks in no
sense impairs the security of the »sacramental sign' in the
sacramental system, that is, as a means of grace.

This sacred

language is beyond deterioration for its indefectibility is
o
guaranteed by its divine institution,*'

The secularization

1, Etienne Gilson, Theologie et Histoire de la Spiritualite
(Paris, J. Vrin,' 1943), pp* 9-10.
2. Not every sign, even for Augustine, is a sacramental sign,
properly speaking: 'Signorum vero alia sunt naturalia, ut
fumus significans ignemj alia data.1 Quoted by Libri IV,
Sententiorum Peter Lombard (Florence: Typographia Collegii
S. Bonaventurae, 19l£j, from Augustine, loc.cit,. n. 2. To
this Peter Lombard adds: *e't eonaa quae data sunt, quaedam
sunt Sacramenta, quaedem non: omne enim Sacramentum est
signum, sed non e converso,1 (II, p. 746),
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of which M Gilson speaks is, rather, to be found in literature
and other forms of art that characterize our culture#

In

other words, what culture has sustained, with respect to
religious symbols, are the secularized forms of sacred symbols
which have lost their significance, not because religion has
lost its significance, but because the symbols themselves
are no longer maintained by the forces that brought them into
being.

Briefly, they have become things to be valued as

heirlooms, not as instruments of grace.
It is clear then that symbols do not stand by
themselves.

They require minds to interpret them,

The

interpretation which minds give them depends ultimately on
the intellectual vision of these minds.

If the intellectual

vision is precisely the same as that which made the symbols —
if, for example, we understand what Chaucer is trying to
convey to his readers through the instrumentality of the
language he uses —

we will interpret the symbols correctly,-

The problem of interpreting symbols, is, however, more
complex than simply putting oneself in the place of their
poet.

When a tradition intervenes between the original

signs and their present condition, as inherited from the
past, it is necessary to interpret them with a mind that
transcends traditiqn.
intellectual gloss.

Language does not provide its own
Living minds must interpret the
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principles within the context of an age,
Everything directly conceived or thought of by our
intelligence, everything of which we have a concept or
'mental word1, may be expressed or translated into
language, But despite the flexibility, the docility,
the delicacy of any system of language-signs, this
expression is always more or less deficient in relation
to thought, The loftiest intellectual knowledge, which
reveals a world of consequences within a single principle,
must, so to speak, be scattered and diluted in order to
be orally expressed,
Indeed it would be absurd to expect material signs,
uttered one after the other, to duplicate or furnish a
facsimile of the vital and immanent act of thought. Nor
is it the purpose of language to furnish such a facsimile
of thought: its object is to permit the intelligence of
the hearer to think, by an active repetitive effort,
what the intelligence of the speaker is thinking, From
this point of view human language performs its function
perfectly. Granted the interpretative effort and the
intellectual activity of the hearep, it is a perfect
system of signs; suppress this effort and this activity
and there remains but a radically insufficient system of
lifeless symbols,
In other words, language not only supposes an effort,.,
on the part of the one who expresses his thought, but also
requires an effort on the part of the listener: a bene
ficent effort that keeps us from depending entirely on the
sign and saves us from falling into what Leibnitz called
'psittacism', a parrot-like use of language,^
The point which Saint Augustine made, naive perhaps to the
moderns, is that signs must signify something.

Inevitably

1, Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Logic (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1937), pp. 58~59.
2,
'Signum est, quod praeter species, quas ingerit sensui,
aliquid facit in cognitionem venire,' De Doctrina Christiana.
II, c, n,l, J, P. Migne, Patrologia Latina XXXIV, 35. The
treatment Saint Augustine gives to signs is ostensibly for the
purpose of elucidating the theology of the Sacraments: ,:Sacramentum est sacrae rei signum', De Civitate Dei, X, c.s. PL
41,282, Augustine's definition of sign is not a general
definition, It designates what the schoolmen would call 'an
instrumental sign', Cf, John of St, Thomas, 0,P», Cursus
philosophicus thomisticus. I, Log, II, P.Q. XXI, 1, p, 646 a,
20-28, (Marietti, Taurini, 1930),
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God is

Saint

Augustine's definition of a sign was retained throughout the
Middle Ages.
In almost every phase of our culture there is
apparent this concern with signs (or what we may better call
1sign-things'), with verification which has to do with the
arrangement of substitutes for things as though they them
selves were things, and not with what they signify.

Verifi

cation has replaced truth; 'coherence' ^ has replaced logic.
Maritain sees this as a contemporary intellectual tendency;
We go to meet reality with a gush of formulas.
Ceaselessly, we launch prefabricated concepts. At the
slightest provocation a new concept is formed of which
we make use in order to take advantage of being, while
protecting ourselves from it and avoiding having to
submit to it. We do not try to see, our intelligence
does not see. We content ourselves with signs, formulae,
expression of conclusions.•. We take more interest in
verifying the validity of the signs and symbols we have
manufactured than in nourishing ourselves with the truth
they reveal. Has not the word truth itself become
suspect to many contemporary philosophers? In fact
our intelligence cares very little for the delights
and enchantments of the truth, any more than for
those of being; rather, our intelligence fears both;

1* Cf. Bertrand Russel, Che Problems of Philosophy (London:
Thornton Butterworth Ltd. , Home University Library Series,
May 1928) pp. 190-193* Cf. supra p. 6. The term 'coherence'
is particularly apt, for things and words considered as things
'cohere*.
It is in this sense primarily that we intend the expression
'verification' to be taken, for ideas are 'verified* in the
modern sense by testing them as though they were things.
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it stops at the level of verification, just as it stops
at the symbol.1
There remains the most important reason, however,
for the philosopher to Jook beyond the sign in his search
for the truth signified.

Philosophy is a search for wisdom.

This has been so since the days of Thales, when the civili
zation of Miletos had reached a point in its development
where it could allow enterprising men to wonder concerning
what is taken otherwise for granted.

Behind the phenomena

of the world in which men ordinarily are absorbed lies the
unknown.

The realization that there are really two worlds,

the known and the unknown, caused men to seek the reasons
of the known in the unknown.

Those who penetrated to this

world of the unknown were counted wise, lovers of wisdom
or philosophers*

This is another way of saying that man

began to philosophize when his mind confronted mystery,
for mystery is nothing else than what is known in part aijd
unknown in part.

There is no philosophy without mystery.

Nor is there any poetry.
In his discussion of the comparable activities
of metaphysics and poetry, M Maritain points out s
One snatches at the spiritual in an idea, by the most
abstract intellectionj the other glimpses it in the
flesh, by the point of the sense sharpened by the
1* The Ways of Faith, in ‘The Commonweal*, Vol. LI 4,
November 4, 1949.
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mind. One enjoys its possession only in the secluded
retreat of the eternal regions; the other finds it at
every cross-roads where the singular and the contingent
meet. Both seek a super-reality, which one attains in
the nature of things, and the other is content to touch
in any symbol whatsoever* Metaphysics pursues essences and
and definitions, poetry every form glittering by the way,
every reflection of an invisible order. The one isolates
mystery in order to know it, the other, through the
harmonies it constructs, handles and makes use of mystery
like an unknown force.
It is a demonstrable thesis which concludes that with
a loss of the sense of mystery, the philosophy and the poetry
of a culture lose their vitality,
be worked out for language.

A case, equally cogent, can

When mystery disappears from

language, it, too, loses its vitality.
part, reflects common sense.

Language, at least in

It is for this reason that it

growns rebellious, so to speak, when it is used to convey
notions inconsistent with common sense.

Inherent in common

sense, though not made explicit, is the same sense of mystery
we discover in the great philosophies of the world.

Thus in

those epochs of history, of which our own is the best example,
when a sense of mystery has all but disappeared, we discover
common sense in conflict with philosophy and the language of
common sense in conflict with the technical jargon of philosophy*
It is, of course, absurd to suggest that philosophy replace its
technical vocabulary with the vernacular.

But it is reasonable

to propose that philosophy restore the place of mystery,

There

I, Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays (London: Sheed and
Ward, 1947) p# 75*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Page

13

is nothing inconsistent in saying that the mystery that gives
vitality to common sense and expressiveness to its vernacular
could not also give life to philosophy without sacrificing
the precision of its vocabulary.
But how should philosophy regain its place by
recognizing mystery?

By reestablishing, we answer, its

liaison with being, its proper object.

It is this being

of which Aristotle spoke and which he made the object of his
metaphysics.

Any deviation from the pursuit of this object,

this ens mysterium. is bound to lead to philosophical
failures and to a contamination of the language which tries
to express it.

History abounds with examples.

Consider, first, the difficulties of language
raised by Heraclitus, which occasioned the discussion
recorded in Plato’s Cratylus.

The Heracletian Cratylus.

after whom Plato’s dialogue was named, had to be content
with a slight gesture of his little finger.

Why so?

because

the philosophy of his master could not be coipmunicated,
Parmenides provides us with a second example,

Logically he

could do little more than Cratylus for the reality he tried
to make philosophically intelligible could be signified by
one word, and no proposition could be constructed which was
not a tautology,

Plato himself had to resort to myth to des

cribe his philosophy of nature, for his ideas were inexpressible.
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The glorious

achievement of the Middle Ages came to an end when its
culture lost its sense of mystery, and when what it
continued to verbalize it no longer took seriously.

The

visible world of the Middle Ages could be signified in its
symbols so long as that world was seen to b© sustained by
the Mysterious God Who brought it into being.
It is the same with mo d e m thought.

As soon as

Descartes revised the traditional modes of thought, he had
to revise the language of philosophy,
more striking example.

Kant provides a

He had to create a new vocabulary

to describe the Newtonian world which he mistook for the
real world.

The technical terms that Kant used are devoid

of mysterious signification,

The world that Newton created

was necessarily a world in which mystery could have no place,
a world in which the being of things was inaccessible.
was Kant's world.

This

Its philosophy, Etienne Gilson has elected

to call a ' p h y s i c i s m ' B u t Kant had another world, the
I
world in which men acted, a real world 'but which could be
reached only in some affective way.
has any intelligible content.

Neither of Kant's worlds

What his new vocabulary reflected

actually was the debility of the modern intelligence,

1* vide E, Gilson, Unity of Philosophical Experience (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937 ) pp. 223 ff»
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•Poetry has been quicker than philosophy to recognize
the necessity of returning to mystery and to the source of its
•vitality:
La podsie est l 1expression, par la langage humain
ramene a son rythae essentiel, du sens mysterieux
des aspects de 1*existence: elle doue ainsi

d1authenticity notre sejour et.constitufe la
seule tache spirituelle.^Poetry, in caning to grips with existence, has seen fit to
restore the signification of language by reestablishing its
relation with mystery* (a)

1* Mallarme, *La Vogue* (April IS, 1886), in La Doctrine
Smboliste, Guy Michaud (Paris, Librarie, 1947).
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CHAPTER

II

The Poetic Disposition of Language

One must not confuse the poetry
of revolution with a revolution
in poetry.
Jean Cocteau

Modem poetry, with a courage
which is sometimes ridiculous,
has undertaken to scour language,
Jacques Maritain

In this chapter our concern is the influence of
poetry on language.

The usefulness of a discussion of this

kind does not require elaborate explaining; it is commonly
accepted that the history of any,nation's language is bound
up with the history of its poets.

In need of explaining,

perhaps, is the posing of the problems for which this discussion
tries to provide solutions as philosophical ones.
Generally, the task of tracing words to their original
uses in the great poetry of a nation is assigned to philology,
The result is a methodical classification of words used in
poetry and in prose alike.

The purpose of such philological

research is to describe (within the limitations of its techniques)
a particular language as a means of communication,

Its biblio
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graphical products are, ultimately, word-lists or grammars in
which are set down the conventional (or 'proper*) meanings and
usages of the spoken and written words of the language it studies.
Thus the work begins with an examination of literature, proceeds
analytically by lifting words out of their contexts,and ends
with the writing of lexicons and syntactical 'rules*.

The cycle

recommences when those who use lexicons and grammars find them ,,
made obsolete by newer and sometimes better modes of expression.
That this is the case with philological research
becomes evident when its method assumes the r3le of literary
criticism.

In this instance it appends its analysis to a

particular work of literature, as if to reconstruct the work
from the elements it has distilled out of the language in which
the work is written,

So doing, it places the work within the

entire context of the language.

The work thereby becomes a

special instance of the universal rules which philology
constructs.

Departures from accepted meanings are noted and,

if sufficiently numerous, can be embraced in wider philological
generalizations,

For this reason the method of philology is

more readily applied to dead languages than to living^

Here

the scholar can work more comfortably, since the ground he
investigates does not shift,

He is able to remove a particular

word, a particular poem or a particular dialect from the total
corpus of a language whose limits he knows.

Philology and
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lexicography, when their concern is with a dead language, have
the tendency to become coextensive: since there is no longer
any problem of changing meanings and since the forces respon
sible for the formation of the language in the first place are
no longer living, the only task that remains for philology to
accomplish is a lexicographical one.
language is different.

The case of a living

Its limits are unknownj its vocabulary

is not fixed by a crystalized literature; its stability is
constantly threatened by obsolescence.

Thus the most ambitious

project to establish fixed meanings of words and their uses is
bound to fall short of its purpose.

It is clear, then, that

while the philology of living language tends to conserve
language, it labours always behind a constantly moving frontier.
Its purpose, it seems,- is being undermined by agencies that
fail to take cognizance of the fruits of its researches.
are these agencies?

What

These agencies, briefly, are represented

by those who write and speak without the help of dictionaries,
lexicons and grammars, to wit, those who write poetry and those
who speak in the vernacular,

We do not, we hasten to add,

exclude scientists who, while they speak a highly technical
language, are also poets when they try to find new expressions
not already existing in their technical lexicons.

Philology

does not, cannot, take into account the expansion of language.
It is limited, therefore, to the data provided by non-philological sources.
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The publication and use of dictionaries and other
products of philological research are not, however, to be
condemned as practices that typify a decadent culture.

They

serve a useful function in facilitating communication among
the living members of a culture and in conserving the symbols
of the past.

In a culture as complex as ours philology is,

therefore, an indispensable instrument whose uses must be
maintained to keep what is good in literature and language.
It provides, moreover, a linguistic orthodoxy without which
education would be impossible.

In these uses tie discern

simply the practical results of philological research and,
as we have already said, these uses are described from the
1

point of view g>f communication.
But philology also presents us with a knowledge of
a definite epistemological type,

Its methods are positive,.

It draws lines, as it were, between points on a horizontal
plane.

Its object terminates, not in an intellectual

knowledge of language, but in the senses and the imagination#
Nevertheless, philology is a science, a science that affirms,
yet without making the essences it handles explicit, the
characteristics of words and language within the limits of
its techniques,^

For this reason philology does not consider

1, Vj_ supra p, 16.
2, Philology belongs to the type of science M Maritain would
call 'la science de la constatation', as opposed to philosophy
and mathematics, which he describes as 'la science de l'expli-
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or make intelligible the mysterious forces that bring new
words and new meanings into being.
cationi: 'II y a des sciences qui portent sur ces essences
comme connues. non pas certes d'une manifere exhaustive, car
nous ne savons le tout de rien, mais enfin comme connues ou
manifestoes (par leurs dehors): ce sont les sciences d6ductives, sciences philosophiques ou sciences math&natiques;
d^ductives A titre bien different d'ailleurs; car ici, dans
le savoir mathematique, l 1esprit saisit par leurs <§l4ments
constitutifs et construit ou reconstruit comme de plainpied
des entit6s qu'il a primitivement tirees du donn£ sensible
ou qu'il edifie sur celles-la> et qui dans le reel (quand
ce sont des entia realla). sont des accidents ou propriety
des corps, mais qu'il traite comme si elles ^talent des
etres subsistants et comme si la notion qu'il s-'en fait
6tait libre de toute origine experimentale; la, au contraire,
dans le savoir philosophique, il saisit des essences substantielles non par elles-memes, mais par leurs accidents propres,
et ne proc&de deductivement qu'en se ravitaillant constamment
dans 1'experience (methode "analytico-synthetique").
Ces sciences~la sont proprement des sciences de
L 1EXPLICATION... ♦propter quid est,. selon la terminologie des
anciens; elles nous revelent les n^cessit^s intelligibles
immanentes a I'objet, elles nous font connaitre les effets
par les principes ou raisons d'Stre, par les causes, en
prenant ce mot au sens tout a fait general que lui donnaient
les anciens, II peut arriver, il est vrai, qu'affrontant une
rSalite trop haute et dont 1'essence ne peut Stre connue que
par analogie, elles doivent se borner (c'est le cas de la
m^taphysique en face de Dieu) a une connaissance de simple
certitude de fait (supra-empirique), mais c'est qu'alors .
elles debouchent pour ainsi dire au deli de 1*explication, et
il reste que de soi elles demandent & d^couvrir 1'essence,
Et il y a des sciences qui portent sur les'essences
comme cach&es. sans pouvoir jamais devoiler en elles-m£mes
les n^cessites intelligibles immanentes a leur objet, ce sont
les sciences inductives, sciences qui (pour autant du moins
qu'elles restent purement inductives, ce qui n'est pas le
cas de la physique et des sciences "experiment ale s'1 des
modernes,,Bacon et Mill se sont bien tromp^3 lk-dessous) ne
vont de soi qu'k Stre des sciences de la C0NSTATATI0N
empirique,* Les DegrSs du Savoir (4th ed,, Paris: Descl^e
de Brouwer ot Cio, 1946), pp« 65 -6 7 ,
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Now that we have described the method we wish to
follow, we are ready to proceed with an examination of the
use of language in poetry, science, and philosophy,
*

*

*

•While the practice of poetry need not in itself
confer wisdom or accumulate knowledge,*

T, S, Eliot has

written, tit ought at least to train the mind in one habit
of universal value:

that of analysing the meanings of words:

of those that one employs oneself, as well as the words of
others.

In times less turbulent than those during which

these words were written, it would have been scarcely neces
sary for 12r Eliot to remind his readers that the office of
poetry is not to be compounded with the office of wisdom.
Still less would he have been obliged to make explicit
reference to one of the special benefits that accrues from
the practice of poetry: sensitivity to verbal signification.
The essay which this apology initiates may well have been
dispensed with, for what Mr

Eliot has to say may have been

said more effectively (in happier times) in conversation, as
he explains in a later essay:

"In a society of smaller size

(a society, therefore, which was less feverishly busy) there
1, The Idea of a Christian Society (New York; Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1940) p« 4*
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might be more conversation and fewer booksj and we should not
find this tendency— of which this essay provides one example—
for those who have acquired some reputation, to write books,,
outside the subject on which they have made that reputation,11
The fact remains, however, that Mr Eliot has published his
notes on problems which theologians, philosophers and sociolo
gists have discussed and continue to discuss.

But where one

might expect to discover Eliot the theologian, the philosopher
or the sociologist, one finds only Eliot the poet,2 with
modesty proportionate to greatness, found only in a poet
conscious of his mission, he declines the official pespon*
sibilities that accompany scientific pronouncements,

His

point of departure is, therefore, never a scientific one.

It

can be described by the term fpsychological*, to the extent
that this much*maligned word describes the nature of the
extraordinary consciousness always a requisite in a good poet,
rather than the impersonal doctrine whose truth he witnesses,
1, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (London: Faber and
Faber, 1948) p,
2, We do not suggest thereby that Mr,Eliot does not possess
more than an ordinary understanding of theological and philo
sophical principles. But he himself claims only what has been
accorded him as a poet: 'To aim at originality would be an
impertinence: at most this essay can be only an original
arrangement of ideas which did not belong to me before and
which must become the property of whoever can use them,1
Ibid,, p, v, Cf,1Tradition and the Individual Talent» in
Selected Essays (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1917) III, 21,
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Thus Mr Eliot, moved by 'the suspicion that the current terms
in which we discuss international affairs and political theory
may only tend to conceal from us the real issues of contem
porary civilization'***, is prepared to take his post among
those 'guardians of the vast armoury of language', to use
Coleridge's phrase,**

The justification for broaching subjects

alien to the work of poetry clearly,lies in the extraordinary
fact of being an extraordinary poet,

With this we should not

quarrel,.. In Mr Eliot we have a first class witness who describes,,
in terms of experience what we intend to describe philosophically.
Behold, then, the poet*

He is, as the word itself

declares, a maker, a maker of language, a craftsman in words,
A poet knows words as a sculptor knows marble, as a musician
knows sound, or as a physician knows medicine*

His knowledge

of language is the sort acquired by a practitioner, belonging,
as Aristotle would say, to the order of praxis,

The poet

comes to this knowledge, of the kind he can justly claim to
have of words, by pleasing himself with regard to the manner
in which he uses them,

But how does the poet so please

himself?

1,. The Idea of a Christian Society, p, v,
2, Miscellanies. Aesthetic and Literary (London: G, Bell and
Sons Ltd,, ed. T, Ashe, 1911) p. 143.
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We answer simply by saying that the poet's pleasure
is derived by making a poem out of words, ' That is, the poet
pleases himself by making something, not in haphazard fashion,
but in accord with the rules of his art,^

It is thus the poet

establishes a liaison,with the mysterious being which makes
the poem intelligible.

In making the poem intelligible he

gives it a form, a substantial form, which may be likened to
the human soul.

This substantial form is what Raiss# Mari tain

calls le sens pofrbique as opposed to le sens logique.
Le sens logique ou rationnel n'est pas exigible en
poesie pour lui-meme, il semble meme extrinseque a la
poesie comme telle, Et cependant, d'une manibre ou
d'une autre, a un degre quelconque, il accompagne
toujours 1 'oeuvre poetique: ou bien d'une faqon explicite,
ou bien eij faisant implicitement appel au concours de
1'intelligence, Faute de quoi la poesie elle-meme
disparait, Voila le paradoxe que nous voudrions
consid^rer.
Le sens poetique se confond avec la poesie elle~
meme. Si j'emploie ici 1'expression sens poetique
plutot que le mot poesie, c'est pour marquer que la
poesie fait etre le pofeme, comme l'ame fait Stre le
corps, en etant la forme (en langage aristot^licien)
ou l'idse (en langage spinoziste) de ce corps, en lui
donnant une signification substantielle, un sens
ontologique.
It is for this reason that the intelligibility of the poem
and hence the meanings of the words which compose it cannot
be discovered by any analysis which resolves it into its
1, vide Jacques Maritain, Art et Scholastique (Paris: La
Librairie de l'Art Catholique, 194&) pp. 57 72,
2, Situation de la Poesie (Paris: Descl^e de Brouwer et
Cie, 1938)' pp." 13-14.
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component parts if each part is considered as a word with
a standard or logical meaning,
What transformation does language undergo when
it becomes the language of a poem?

First, the being of

the language is improvedj it becomes informed by virtue
of being disposed.

It receives, in the language of the

Platonists, a splendor veri. the splendor ordinls. as St,
Augustine says, and the splendor formae. as St. Thomas
says,1

It is because the intelligence loves beauty, form

and truth that it makes the language conform to itself in,,
the intuitive vision which the poet expresses in the poem.
Second, the poet makes use of language but in so doing
creates a speech,

In this connection the differentiation

alluded to by L, H, Gray is particularly useful,^ There
are three separate aspects of language conveyed by the
words language, tongue and speech.

But better rendered

by the French: langage, langue and parole, which designate
respectively language in its universal, its social, and its
individual aspects,
Therefore the poet makes use of a langue to create
a parole.
pleased,

When this is accomplished the poet should be
*If a writer wishes to give the effect of speech

1, Cf. Jacques Maritain, Art et Scholastique (Paris: La
Librairie de l ’Art Catholique, 1948) p. 37.
2, Louis H, Gray, Foundations of Language (New York:
Macmillan, 1939) p. 18.
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he must positively give the effect of himself talking in
his own person or in one of his r o l e s . T h i s is what
happens in the great moments of the history of our language
when a Chaucer is born.

It is not inconceivable that in

creating a speech or parole that a poet please only himself
by speaking in a language clear only to himself^ not to
others,

James Joyce provides us with an example:

'En

realite, 1*auteur1 (Joyce) '6crit dans une langue £trangbre

2

connue de lui seul, mais bien connue de lui,*

Yet it is not necessary that the poet change the
language from its grammatical and orthographical form in
order to transfigure language.

In fact, the poet can derive

his vocabulary from the commonest speech.

What Theodore

Haecker has written of Virgil's talent to transform, much
to the sorrow of translators, the words of daily social .
intercourse into poetry, illustrates precisely what we
mean here: 'The rock on which translators come to grief
lies in this inexorable law of classic art: out of the
commonest words must be fashioned the most uncommon line;
soiled and jaded words must be lifted up into the glory of
the pure w o r d , T h i s

freshness which comes in the

1, T, S, Eliot, 'Rhetoric and Poetic Drama', in Selected
Essays (London: Faber and Faber Ltd,, 1919) p, 38,
2, Raissa Maritain, Situation de la Poesie (Paris: Descl^e
de Brouwer et Cie, 1938) "p, 31
3*

Virgil (London: Sheed and Ward, 1937) p, 24.
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making of language is sometimes discovered and not made
by the poet, but far the same reasons.
That upon which one in vain has sought enlighten
ment from books is suddenly illuminated by a flash of
light at hearing one serving-maid conversing with
another} an expression which one has tried in vain to
torture out of one*s own brain, in vain has sought in
dictionaries, even in the ‘Dictionary of the Society
of the Sciences** this one hears in passing — a raw
soldier utters it, and does not dream what a rich man
he is,
Por the same reasons it is understandable why
a revolution in poetry brings with it all sorts of
obscurity.--obscurities which result from,!he matter of
the poem and not its substantial form;

*.,, the material

of art is never quite the same1, says T, S, Eliot,

Thus

when new matter is informed even by the same old ideas,
it is the matter which gives rise to the obscurities,
It is only after the matter has become familiar that
these obscurities are removed.

But the process of

familiarization begins when the poet publishes his poem,
when the poet‘s idiom becomes either part of the language
in which he writes or part of a new language which he
creates; and when, in effect, he surrenders himself to
the common intelligibility which his poetry, now
depersonalized, is bound to assume,
1, S. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life*s Way (Pr'nceton: Princeton
University Press, Trans, Walter Lowrie,1940) p, 440,
2,

Selected Essays (London: Faber and Faber Ltd,,.1917) P« 16,
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The use of unfamiliar matter to force a revolution
may involve another language, as when an English poet makes
use of French wordsj it may involve the use of archaicisms,
as when meanings latent in language are once more revived)
or it may involve the use of argot or slang.

The need for

new and unfamiliar matter is always present, not only for
poets, but for artists of all kinds.

The cubists in

modern art are good examples: they needed new building
blocks, so to speak.

The

constantly shifting ground on

which the poet builds his verbal edifices should not,
however, discourage poetry.

It is imperative, in fact,

that the poet keep on the move, ready always to endow the
mercuric medium in which he works with a flash of the eternal
light his soul reflects.

If the soul of the poet is

reflected in the work of the poem,, the words must be indeed
somewhat obscure.

Every human soul is an unrepeatable

mystery, never completely comprehended, not even by its
possessor.

Obscurity, then, should be welcomed if, in

hiding the hackneyed and the common uses which wear language
out, it reveals the mysterious order of the poet’s soul.
The process which Mr Eliot has called •depersonalization' does not prevent an increasing revitalization of
language by poetry,

’Depersonalization' is of two kinds: the

one 'creative’, the other 'corruptive'.

When a word becomes
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purely a convention of communication and nothing more, its de
personalization is 'corruptive'.

The word 'nice' is sufficient

as an example: pleasing everyone, it pleases no one.

In 'creative

depersonalization' where life is given to a word without pre
cluding its general use, it pleases everyone, by pleasing someone,
the poetj and no less so if, in entering the language, it must
suffer the pangs of obscurity.

Thus the words of poetry

('reverse' signs) signify at once objects and a subject, the
poet.

By making a word signify what is in his own soul the poet

accomplishes his revolution of language.

Here we can understand

the affinities between poetry and experimental science.

The

poet wishes to signify an order higher than that discovered by
his senses, by improving what he discovers, by remedying the
deficiency of sense knowledge.

But he does not accomplish this

revolution by destroying what he discovers.

The final effect

is achieved when the order which sensible, concrete things have
in the poet's imagination (in his soul), is reflected by the
disposition of the words of his poetry.
first, the object after,

The subject is revealed

In science, on the contrary, it is the

object which is revealed first by 'direct' signs.
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III

The Influence of Science on Language

In this chapter we study the effect of science on
verbal signification.

The way in which we propose to do

this is to examine various mythological literatvires that
result from an inability of science to reach the mysterious
realm of existence.

Modern scientistic mythology, it is

our belief, has arisen from the disintellectualization of
philosophy cqt off from reality and existence by empiricism
and idealism.

The language that this mythology has created

is a language of fictions which have meaning only in the
arena of action.
There are three positions that merit our attention
in this connection.

The first position is that of Professor

Cornford; of special interest here is his interpretation of
Plato's Timaeus,

The second is that of Hans Vaihinger's

philosophy of 'As If*.

And finally Jacques Maritain's thought

on the purpose of Plato's mythology will be reviewed.
With the exception of M Maritain's position, which
transcends the other two, we discover analogies of myth as a
fictitious ideal.

The purpose of reviewing these positions

becomes clear when we consider the emphasis that contemporaries
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The effect on language has been tremendous.

Words no longer signify an intelligible content, but a feeling,
Language has its own modern mythology replete with meaningless
symbols which evoke little thought but which can, nevertheless,
serve as powerful instruments in firing men to action.

It is

almost true to say that a .greater part of the modem vocabulary
is a lexicon of attitudes.
We should first point out that the three positions Vfe
have chosen are not to be taken strictly as historical stadia.
Rather they exhibit in a remarkable way the role that meta
physical thought plays in the drama of language,

Cornford

and Vaihinger have no metaphysics in the true sense of the
word.

For this reason they fall back upon erroneous expla

nations which betray the common source of their misconceptions,
M Maritain, on the other hand, sees quite clearly what is
wrong with the modem world, precisely because the centre
of his philosophy is metaphysical.

The conclusion which we

here anticipate is that contemporary language is a language
of fictitious meanings because the moderns have attempted
to replace metaphysics with a disintellectualized empiricism.
Words have nothing to signify except what relates to the
practical order.

Let us then consider first the teaching of

Professor Cornford,
Here it is a question of defining the Timaeus of
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Is it fancy?

We

let Professor Cornford. answer:
The Timaeus is a poem, no less than the De rerum natura
of Lucretius, and indeed more so in certain respects.
Both poets are concerned, in the first instance, with
our practical attitude towards the world — what we
should make of our,life there and how to face the
prospect of death,
* Ostensibly Professor Cornford1s answer here
embodies a moral purpose.
based on literal truth*

But such a purpose cannot be
Hence the mythological character .

of the Timaeus:
There are two senses in which the Timaeus is a
•myth* or •story* (Mythos)... no account of the
material world can ever amount to an exact and selfconsistent statement of unchangeable truth. In the,,
second place the cosmology is cast in the form of a
cosmogony, a 'story1 of events spread out in time.,.
Such a story was, to Plato, very far from being like
the truth.
Let us understand Professor Cornford aright.

It

is impossible, he seems to say, to represent a changing
world in any other fashion than by a form of literature
which is itself spread out in time.

In this light the

Timaeus is a reconstruction of sensible reality (or should
we say unreality?) which cannot be represented literally.
Thus then philosophical analysis fails, myth succeeds, and
for the same reason, the Timaeus can be no more than a
•likely' story:
l f P. M, Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul Limited, 1948) p, 31.
2, loc.cit.
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.,,the important point is that no matter whether you
prefer to analyze the world or to construct it piece
by piece, the account can never be more than ‘likely*,
because of the changing nature of its objectj it can
never be revised and amended into exact truth,
Professor Cornford adds to this, and quite rightly, that any
interpretation of the Timaeus that considers it an allegory
is incorrect.

Though the myth of the Timaeus is a ‘likely*

story, it is not to be confused with the plausibility of
modern scientific approximations.

Yet his explanation was

as good as that of Democritus;
The cosmology of the Timaeus is poetry, an image that
may come nearer to conveying truth than some other
cosmologies. But the truth to which it Can approximate
is not an exact and literal statement of ‘physical laws*,
such as modern science dreams ofj it is the truth,
firmly believed by Plato, that the world is not solely
the outcome of blind chance or necessity, but shows
the working of a divine intelligence, Plato would
have claimed that, considered as an explanation of
sensible appearances, his own theory of the simple
primary bodies and their transformations was quite
as plausible as the atomic theory of Democritus, He
would also have claimed that it was a better explanation
and nearer to the truth in that it attributes to intel
ligible design much that Democritus left to mere chance.
This nearness to truth has nothing to do with the
modern notion of ‘approximation1 indicated, for example,
in the following passage: 'The accuracy of the obser
vations is dependent on the limits to the discriminative
fineness of our senses, and on the delicacy of our
"instruments of precision"*,, When all possible
precautions have been taken, the measurements of
physical magnitudes are necessarily approximate and
would remain so even if we had not to allow fop the
possible modifications of every hypothesis in natural
science by the discovery of new "appearances'".

1, loc, cit,
2*

loc, cit, (Cornford quotes Taylor here: loc, cit. n,4).
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If we interpret Cornford correctly on this point,
we are left with the conclusion that Plato possessed a
metaphysics in which he idealized plans for action and a
poetic in which he expresses these ideals,

On the same

subject perhaps more interesting is Hans Vaihinger's
philosophy »As If*.
Fundamentally his thought resembles Cornford's
ideas,

Like Cornford, he regards Plato's myths as pure

fictions .•’•And like Cornford, ho evinces the same Kantian
tendency to suppose only two limited worlds, the world of
science and the world in which we act,

Having denied the

means of access to a knowledge of the world of things, he
regards truth as an impossible attainment.

The only

alternative is to regard all hypothesis, abstractions,
categories, and so forth, traditionally held to be
instruments by which the reality of things was grasped,
as fictions,

Conceptual knowledge, ideational constructs

and all such moans and logical instruments are* consequently,
to be abandoned.

The beginnings of a theory of fictions,

so construed, can be discerned in the history of Greek
philosophy}
Before there could be a logical theory of fictions,
they had first to be created and employed in scientific
yide Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of »As If* (London:
Boutledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1949), pp. 26, 140,
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practice — for if there is any H e l d where theory
does not precede practice, it is here. The scanty
beginnings of a practical employment of the fiction
in ancient times hardly sufficed for the creation
of a theory, and had anyone in those days really
been struck by the peculiar characters of the fiction,
he would certainly have at once confused it with an
ordinary assumption or hypothesis. The view that we
can and must think, without thereby necessarily
implying anything as to the nature of existence, and
yet be able to attain correct practical results, was
one to which the ancients never attained. That we are
compelled to think of something was always regarded as
a proof of the reality of what was thought of. That
what we are (apparently) compelled to think of, is not
objective but can only be a means — such an idea is
an entirely modern product,-*It would be possible to disagree with Vaihinger's inter
pretation of Greek philosophy in this passage on the ground
that he fails to consider the nature of judgment as affirming
essences of existents, which would explain how conceptual
knowledge is completed in an existential judgment.

However,

more urgent is the necessity of demonstrating exactly what
Vaihinger means here.
First, it is clear enough what he means by
1scientific practice1 if, as he intends, the expression
is used in its m o d e m sense.
of verification.

He refers principally to a type

'Scientific practice' is the ground on which

certain theories are put to pasture.

The validity of the

practice could not, of course, be a priori determined until this
verlficatory or testing period were in some sense completed.
1.

ibid.. pp. 139-140.
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Patently, and this is our second point, lacking in
Vaihinger's philosophy is a metaphysics and a philosophy
of nature which would provide him with a true centre for
moral theory, and not a fictitious one, for action;

if he

possessed this, he would not have interpreted Plato’s
Mythology as a necessary poetic which accompanies a
philosophy unable to express the sensible real, in which
action takes place.
Before considering Maritain’s position, let us
dwell on Plato himself.

The philosophy of Plato, as it

appeared in The Republic, was built on the theory that
somewhere there exist archetypes of all the qualities of
the sensible universe.

These archetypes are concepts or

ideas, and are the only objects which satisfy the require
ments of science.
pation.

These ideas exist in things by partici

The things themselves, since they are not ideas, are

not reality; they belong to the realm of pure becoming (as
Heraclitus had taught), and are the objects of imagination and
opinion.

Mathematics provides the prototype of the science

which in a sort of Pythagorean excursus lifts the mind from a
consideration of sensible things to a contemplation of
intelligible necessities:
...arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect,
compelling the soul to reason about abstract number,
and rebelling against the introduction of visible or
tangible objects into the argument,,.this knowledge
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may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it
clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in
the attainment of pure truth... Knowledge is the
real object of the whole science.,.the knowledge
at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal>
and not of aught perishing and transient,..geometry
will draw the soul towards truth, and create the
spirit of philosophy,1
But still Plato lacked a medium of communication,
Mythology enabled him to speak of the physical world even
though it is not an object of knowledge.

He developed

mythology to such perfection that had to resort to an
explanation of the most abstract problems by means of
these analogies.

The finest literary example of this

is found in his analogy of the cave, in which man is
described as a captive in a cave, seeing only the shadows
cast on the wall before him of the living things which
move behind him in the sunlight of the intelligible
world.

He concludes this analogy thus:

But the release of the prisoners from chains,
and their translation from the shadows to the images
and to the light, and the ascent from the underground
den to the sun, while in his presence they are vainly
trying to look on animals and plants and the light
of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their
weak eyes the images in the water (which are divine),
and are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of
images cast by a light of fire, which compared with
the sun is only an image)— this power of elevating ■
the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation
of that which is best in existence, with which we may
compare the raising of that faculty which is the very

The Republic (New York: The Modern Library, Trans, by
B, Jowett, 1945) VII, 525-527.
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light of the body to the sight of that which is
brightest in the material and visible world — this
power is given, as I was saying, by all that study
and pursuit of the arts [of mathematics]] which has
been described.
The expression of metaphysical principles by
means of mythology was not restricted to Plato alone.
We find in the rituals of contemporary primitives a
complete philosophy of life based on the explanatory
principle of legend and myth,

The powerful influence in

tribal life of such ritualistic customs as black,.magic,
totems, and voodoo, is difficult to overestimate,
Jacques Maritain, in his discussion of the symbolic rites
of primitive^, explains it so:
,,.in order to re-endow things with the
efficacity of an Archtypal-sign, which is their
origin and from which they derive and in which
they participate, the pseudo“Platonism of primitive
man accounts for them, not by a supra-temporal Idea,
but by a story (which reverts to a pre-temporal
event). It has been said that the etiological myth
.justifies things, it Validates 1 them. Already, in
a nocturnal fashion, it assigns to them a 'cause' —
however different that cause may be from the 'causes'
of our science. Already it corresponds to a seeking
after knowledge, to a magical rough sketch of know
ledge, But all this while making manifest its
practical origin and its dependence with regard to
the practical sign,^
Among civilized moderns, myths still hold an
unconquerable realm.

Though centuries have passed since

1* loc, cit, p, 532,
2, Ransoming the Time (New York: Charles Scribner1s Sons,
1941) p. 247.
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the philosophy of Plato was established, man still clings
to Platonist mythology to help him in his explanation of
what should be explained abstractly.

Climaxing his search

for truth in the signs expressing it, and becoming ensnared
in a mesh of the symbols of modem mythology, the searcher
finds the result as confusing and futile as the mathematician1
!?.
attempt to elucidate the tternal verities with numbers.
Numerology is a kind of mythology.

Perhaps the best example

in our own culture is the myth of necessary progress.

This

myth, as others that rob time-honoured words (like ’science*,
‘democracy*, ’history*) of their treasured meanings, has no
meaning in the sense that it expresses no truth.

The genesis

of this myth among the moderns is interesting to trace:
...the very idea of necessary and universal progress
is, strictly speaking, not an idea at all. It is
not a concept whose purpose is to furnish the
intellect with a hold upon the real, and therefore
the intellect cannot measure or rectify it. On the
contrary it is one of those merely verbal formulas —
which are more perfect in their order in proportion
as they are more independent of, and remote from,
and arbitrarily imposed upon, things. If you would
understand their origin, go back to the Cartesian
clear idea. From the clear idea pass on to the
facile idea — facile in that it allows of the very
widest application, and explains the greatest number
of things with the least effort — effort of thought
particularly. From that you pass easily to the
idea-feeling which, applied to things without taking
account of their distinctive natures and enfolding
within its wide sympathy all field§6f thought,
connotes no more than an effective state or a prac
tical attitude of the thinking subject. And now at
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last, at a third remove from the clear idea, you
arrive at what I can only call the idea-myth which,
emptied of all intelligible content and having no
other end save to stimulate in the imagination and
the appetite certain well-recognised and pleasurable
reactions, dominates despotically the whole field of
representation and the individual himself, whom it
sets a-quiver the moment it is put before his mind.
Thus have come to birth those ideological divinities,
those pseudo-ideas wherein the real is altogether
swallowed up, which in their totality constitute
modem mythology.
This passage brings us to the heart of the
problem created by contemporary scientistic mythology.
The 'idea-feeling* of which M Maritain speaks has a
verbal correspondent.

If ideas are emptied of signifi

cation so also are the words that signify them,

It is

this loss of the ontological content of ideas that is
responsible for the disintellectualization of language.
This is the principle which makes M Maritain's explanation
of Platonic mythology correct and the explanations of
Vaihinger and of Cornford false.

To substantiate these

observations let us examine M Maritain's interpretation
of Plato's myths#

To understand his position it is

1j, Jacques Maritain, Theonas (London: Sheed and Ward, 1933)
pp. 108-109. Cf. C. K. Ogden, Bentham's Theory of Fictions.
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1932)
quoting Bentham's Works. Vol. Ill, pp. 593-59k ): 1*Give us
our rights, say the thousands and the millions. Give us
our rights, they say, and they do well to say so. Yet, of
all who say so, not one perhaps can say, not one perhaps
ever conceived clearly, what it is he thus calls for —
what sort of a thing a right is.'
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necessary, first, to point out that he judges Plato's
philosophy of nature in the light of his metaphysios,
Plato's metaphysics he designates as une metaphysique
de 1'extra reel.1

In other words, the objects of

knowledge on which metaphysics bears are existentially
separate from things.

The scientific prototype of

Platonic metaphysics is in this respect mathematical:
Metaphysique extra-reelle qui est, en somme, concue
par Pinton a 1*image des mathematique, La geometrie
constitue, elle aussi, une monde extra-r^el, et
tout philosophe qui commence par la geometrie, qui
inscrit a sa porte la devise platonicienne, sera
tente inevitablement de concevoir ainsi la m&taphysique sur le type des mathematique et de colloquer
les objets du metaphysicien dans un monde separ6.
This understood it is easy to see how it is impossible
to conceive of a philosophy of nature.

Nature constitutes

the sensible, imitable, contingent reality of things.
But philosophy bears upon a world of changeless essences
entirely separated from things.

There can be, therefore,

no philosophy of nature for Plato,

What is known of

nature is necessarily consigned to the category of
opinion,(doxa)^
...il n'y a pas, il ne peut pas y avoir de philosophie
de la nature dans un systeme comme celui de Platon.
D'un cote, vous avez la doxa, 1'opinion, qui concerne

1. Jacques Maritain, La Philosophie de la Nature (Paris:
Chez Pierre f^qui, 1948) "p. 3.

2. loc, cit.
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Xe monde sensible et son devenir, de 1'autre vous
avez le monde des archetypes dternels, objet de
la metaphysique. Vous avez dlun cot! 1* opinion
port ant sur le monde du devenir et puis, en tant
que science, vous avez le s mathematiques et la
metaphysique, pas de connaissance scientifique de
la nature, pas de connaissaince scientifique du
monde du mouvement et du temps. C'est pourquoi
lorsque le philo sophe cherchera malgrd tout k
dormer une interprdtaticn de ce monde, et a
s'elever au-dessus de 1'opinion commune, de
llopinion vulgaire, il ne pourra proceder qu'a
l 1aide de mythes. L 1usage de mythes pour
interpreter la nature sensible est reellement
indispensable dans la philosophie de Platon.
D’une raaniere generale, je crois qu'on peut dire
que le recours k des mythes explieatifs est rendu
neeessaire par toute tentative d'expliquer les
phenomenas de la nature a 1>aide uniquemtat du
savoir mathematique. *
From the above text, it should be manifest to the
reader that a mathematicised science which lacks a
philosophy of nature, a philosophy making motion
and change intelligible, necessitates a poetic
explanation of nature.

Poetry (now no longer

defined as the ’divination of the spiritual in the
things of sense'

has been saddled with the task

of description, a task for which it was not originally
intended, and for which it is ill adapted*

1*

ibid. pp. 6-7•

2* Jacques Maritain, ’The Frontiers of Poetry1, in
Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays (London: Sheed
and Ward, 1947) p. 75.
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The mistake, then, is not linguistic. Language
has n6t deserted man; man has deserted language.
is it a scientific error.

Nor

It is understandable that

science must create a language with specialized
syntax and grammar to express the relations it knows.
It is, rather, an intellectual error.

If, in fact,

there has arisen a scientistic mythology which invests
words once conveying deeper meanings with ’scientific1
meanings,

Sho, k b may ask, are responsible?

The only

plausible answer is: the 'philosophers’. From Descartes
to Kant we discern the first phase in the dilution of
verbal meanings.

It is an easy matter to trace, as

M. Maritain has done, the transition from idea to ideafeeling, from Descartes' Discourse on Method to Kant's
Critiques, from a mathematicization of language'*' to a
frantic and futile attempt to restore its meanings

1. Cf. Peter Wust, 'Crisis in the West', Essays in Order
# 10, (New York: Sheed and War, 1940) p. 117. ‘The insist
tence of science that perception shouod be as much dehuman
ized as possible was,..properly speaking, an aspiration
towards an utterly despiritualized reality, which was to
present only an absolutely calculable mechanism. The
beginning of this tendency is already typified by Descartes'
discovery of analytic geometry. However important in the
abstract this discovery may have been for mathematics, it
became, so to speak, the prototype of the relativity mania
which characterizes m o d e m science. Just as in the first
case the mathematical forms were reduced to their numerical
ratios, so the whole domain of forms proper to being was to
be resolved into similar relative values. It is hardly to
be wondered at, then, if gradually space and time became
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in the world of action by making it affective and from Kant'*'
to the proponents of 'value theories' in whom the cycle is
completed.

2

We have, therefore, on the one hand laws ,

theories, hypothesis, and so forth, and, on the other, the
world of values or the world of action.
are needed for each world.

Two vocabularies

And in fact we do have two

vocabularies, the one the physico-mathematical vocabulary
of science, and the other the vocabulary of mythology.
Neither of these vocabularies is sufficient, for neither
is metaphysical, nor for that matter 'physical' (in the
ancient sense).

Since the language in which we speak of

nature is mathematicized, only motionless essences are
grasped.

But nature changes, is in a constant state of

the sole great irreducible factors of existence, the over
coming of which human thought set before itself as its
almost exclusive aim,'
And so with language: The ideal to which' contem
porary semanticists aspire is, in the last resort, a
language completely mathematicised.
1, R, A. Wilson, The Miraculous Birth of Language (New York:
The Philosophical Library, 1948) p* 53. 'When Kant in his
investigation of the nature and validity of human knowledge
in the Critique of Pure Reason (17$l) undertook an examination
of space and time as the starting point in the discussion, he
struck the path which ail fruitful philosophical investiga
tion has followed since,' And it is thus that Professor
Wilson wishes to investigate language and so add to the long
list of unphilosophical treatises that have since been
written on other subjects, a time-space account of language.
(cf‘ ibid. PP* 54-55).
2, Which Vaihinger defines as 'the summation of constant
relations where the chance variations and apparent irregu
larities in detail are disregarded', (ibid. p. 215).
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Nor is it possible for a mathematicised language

to describe •goods*, necessary for moral action,

*In

mathematicis non est bonum', the ancients used to say.

It

is for this reason we should retain the term 'value1 to
designate what the moderns mean by incentives for action
which have no foundation in the intellectual order but merely
in the space-time world of Kant wherein there is no morality.
Actually Hans Vaihinger's errors are more instructive than
they might first appear,

A 'summational fiction', he would

say, is 'in theory a comparatively worthless construct'."*"
It is worthless because no plausible conduct can be based
on it.

This is quite true, if,the theory is 'scientific' in

the physico-mathematical sense.

What Professor Vaihinger

unwittingly demonstrates in his Philosophy of 'As If' is
M Maritain's thesis that without a true metaphysics, there
is no philosophy of nature and that without a philosophy
of nature there is only mythology.
We need only to add that the language of science is
not a universal Instrument,
convey.

It conveys only what it should

Should we try to make it convey more we are left

with Professor'Vaihinger's world of 'summational fictions',
a veritable wasteland of meaningless symbols.

1, loc, cit.
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IV

Conclusion

Mme Maritain provides us with the important
distinction which begins our conclusion:
C 1est la ce qui distingue tout d'abord le poeme de
toute oeuvre de mode prosaique, je ne dis pas de
toute prose, Dans le mode prosaique, en effet, les
mots ne sont presque exclusivement que des signesi
ils sont 111, avant tout, pour referer I 1esprit k ce
qu*ils signifient; eux-memes, ils ont une importance
secondaire. Tandis qu'en poisie les mots sont h la
fois des signes et des ob.jets (des objets porteurs
d*images) qui s'organisent en un corps vivant et
independantj Ils ne peuvent ceder la place a un
synonyme sans que souffre ou meure le sens du poeme
comme tel.
On the one hand, we have then words which comprise the
constituitive parts of a work of art, viz., a poem.
On the other, we have words whose primary purpose is to
point to something beyond themselves.

It goes without

saying that the words used in onecase can be identical
materialiter to those used in theother.There is no
reason, therefore, to prevent oursaying

that the same

dictionary could list all the words used in a given poem
and in a given scientific treatise.

But it is important

to point out that the meanings of the words in the

1. ibid.. p, 15,
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scientific treatise would be close to the meanings found in
the dictionary.

This we have alrtady proved in Chapter II,

when we demonstrated that a philological description of
language that ends with the work of the lexicographer is not ,,
sufficient to account for the creative influx of new meanings.
Every new poem proposes a new set of meanings.
indicated

As we have

in Chapter II. the source of these meanings can be

found in the unique experience of the root; that is, where the
language is poetic.

This experience is spiritual:

La source de la poesie et de toute intuition
creatrice est dans une certaine experience qu'on peut
appeler *connaissance' obscure et savoureuse, d'une
saveur toute spirituelle, car a ces profondeurs tout
est esprit et vie, et toute poete sait qu'il y p6netre
par un recueillement de tous ses sens, si fugitif
soit-il, condition premiere de la conception poetique.
It is evident then that the term of this spiritual
influx belongs to those things which the mind produces outside
of itself.

Thus language is generated neither by chance nor

by nature.

To make this clear let us examine a text from

Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics:
Tertio dicit, quod res acquirunt form m ex agentibus
similibus: dicens, quod quaecumque substantia fit 'ex
agente univoco,' idest simili secundum formam, Qmnes enim
substantiae, quae generantur, generantur aut a natura,
aut ab arte, aut a fortuna, aut 'automato,' idest casu,
idest per se vano, Differt autem ars a natura, quia ars
est principium agendi in alio, natura autem est principium
actionis et motus in eo in quo est. Manifestum est autem,
quod ea quae generantur ab arte, fiunt ex sibi simili.
1, Raissa Maritain, Situation de la Poesie (Paris: DesclSe
de Brouwer, 1938) pp. 35”36,
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Aedificator enim, per formam domus quam habet in mente,
facit domum quae est in materia.
Manifestly, language is generated by art,

There are exceptions

which might be raised as objections to Thomas' treatment of
things produced outside the mind; for example, it could be
said that certain words enter the language a fortuna. as in
the case of mistaken meaning, which is ascribed to a word and
which gains currency.

Or, it may be objected that certain

words come into being a natura. as in the case of onomatopoeic
words.

In both these examples, it is the aptness of the word

to convey an idea rather than its manner of coming into being
that allows it to enter the language.

This aptness always

depends on the projection of meaning into it ab arte.

But

while the poet necessarily ascribes meanings to words he usejg,
his interest is in words as things, since they are for him
the means of making a thing.

For the scientist, on the other

hand, there is a production of something in the mind; words
are a means of conveying his thoughts.

For the poet, words

are (in a manner of speaking) the goal, which is making; for
the philosopher, a means of conveying ideas.
The scientist, since he is concerned only with the
speculative order, has as his intention knowledge for the sake
of knowing.

He is concerned with the truth itself, not With

1, Thomas Aquinas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria
(Taurini: Marietti, 1925) p. 691.
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the means by which the truth is reached or communicated.
him, then, language is a system of signs.

For

Words point the

way towards concepts, concepts take the mind to things, but
both are means to the en4 , and are not known directly in
themselves.

In a work of scientific abstraction, then, the

medium in which a treatise is presented is made up of
speculative signs; these signs may be changed in position,
even substituted for by other signs which are synonomous ,
but the same meaning is derived from the whole.
A poem, on the other hand, cannot have the position
of its parts altered, or the whole will lose its inference,
and the poem is destroyed.

In scientific prose, as we said

above, the words are used almost exclusively as signs, and a
treatise can be paraphrased without injuring the substance of
the treatise or altering the meaning of the original; if a
poem is translated, however, there is a substantial change;
the only way in which there can be a poem before and after
translation is to create a new poem with its own poetic sense.
Since this is true, the •parts* of the poem, the words, must
be more than .purely speculative signs directing the mind
toward truth*

They must be things in themselves:

1. Strictly speaking, synonymous words are impossible. Where
it is possible to substitute one word for another, it is
because the word does not matter as much as that which,.it
signifies* Such is the case in scientific treatises. In poetry
synonyms are often used as diametrically opposed words*
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The birth of idea, and hence of intellectual life
in us, seems bound up with the discovery of the value
of meaning of a sign. An animal employs signs without
perceiving the relationship of meaning. To perceive the
relationship of meaning is to have an idea — a spiritual
sign. Nothing could be more suggestive in this connection
than that kind of miracle which is the first awakening of
intelligence in blind deaf-mutes,,.: essentially it depends
upon the discovery of the relationship of the meaning of
some gesture with regard to a desired object. The sign is
the keystone of intellectual life,-*In a footnote, referring to the same problem, he adds:
For the very genesis, for the first stirring of the
idea as distinct from images, the intervention of a
sensible sign is necessary,,.it is necessary that the
relationship of meaning should first be actively exercised
in a gesture, a cry, in a sensory sign bound up with the
desire to be expressed. Knowing this relationship of
meaning (signification) will come later, and this will
be to have the idea, even.if it is merely implicit, of
that which is signified, ...Language properly so called
(conventional sensory signs) develops out of this
’language* of natural sensory signs,^
To sum up, then, both poet and philosopher make use
of words, each for their own purpose,

The poet to communicate

concrete images, to 'make* poems for the sake of expressing
beauty, the philosopher for transportation from sensible things
to the Real Truth,

To quote Maritain again, 'the creative

idea expresses itself finally in matter, as the speculative
intuition of the philosopher does in the concept or mental
word.

And in truth these are analogous: to perform the inner

word in the mind, and the work of art in matter.'^
1, Jacques Maritain, Ransoming the Time (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1946) pp* 220-221,
2, loc.cit., n. 2.
3, Art and Poetry. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946)
pp. 80-81,
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Language is always a substitute for discourse of
one kind or another.

This is true for poetry as well as for

prose; for any notation, mathematical or musical; in fact,
for any kind of specifically human language.

Words which

compose language, living or dead, spoken or written, are in
turn substitutes for things.

But there is an important

difference between a word as it appears by itself and as it
appears in context.

This we have already,.suggested.

It

remains now to make these notions precise*
A few moments of reflection raises disconcerting
paradoxes.

First, if words are substitutes for things, then

it seems that context depends solely on the arrangement (or
possible arrangement) of the things they represent.

Second,

if we say that words have two meanings, namely, the meaning
they have by themselves and the meaning they have in context,
it seems thatit becomes impossible to use language} because
to learn the first meaning is futile if it is obliterated in
the context wherein it receives its second meaning.

These two

paradoxes must be resolved if only to avoid the alternative
to them, thatis, to say that meaning is derived from the use
to which they

may be put

as purely practical signs.

Let us consider, then, the first paradox:

Words

are substitutes for things, but it is necessary to §dd, in
an indirect manner.

Directly they signify concepts.

The
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laws which govern the arrangement of concepts (which are
studied in logic) are not the same as those which govern
things.

It is absurd, therefore, to suppose that any verbal

arrangement will suffice to serve directly as a substitute
for an arrangement of things.

It is equally absurd to

propose a grammatical arrangement as a substitute for a
logical arrangement, for the grammarian considers the
relations that exist among words as parts of speech.

For

these reasons it is necessary to rule out the claims of
logisticians when they say that it is possible to dispense
with logic and thinking by providing laws and rules that
govern ideographic signs (which are things primarily rather.:
than signs).

But let us add this classification:

We have to consider three distinct realms* each
having its own laws: the realm of concepts, the realm of
words, and the realm of things.

The office of the concept is

to signify things, and the office of the word is to signify
concepts.

Now we might reasonably ask: How is it possible

to correlate these three realms?

To answer, let us consider

respectively and by itself each of the three terms: concept,
word and thing.

By itself the concept is seen to be a formal

sign, one whose essence is to signify.

In so doing it does

not reveal itself, but in a perfeqt fashion reveals or makes
known something other than itself.

By itself a word represents
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It is a material sign which, for this reason,

does not perform a purely significative function.
in order to make something else known.
neither appears, nor reveals.

It appears

By itself the thing

To appear it must be objectised,

i.e., it must become an object of knowledge.

It follows, then,

a word by itself signifies directly not a thing, but an object,
or the thing, not as thing, but the thing insofar as it is
known.

It is necessary now only to point out that if the

object is not a thing, then words cannot be directly
substituted for things.

It is impossible, therefore, to

effect an arrangement of words as though words were due
substitutes for things.

The arrangement of words depends,

it also follows, on the arrangement of concepts,
This conclusion has important practical consequences.
The first and foremost is that no formula for action can be
derived from the techniques of word arrangements.

No self-

adjusting formula which attempts to establish a direct
connection between words and action is possible unless
thought intervenes, any more than it is possible to construct
a poem by using nothing else than a rhyming dictionary.
To give the above remarks more precise philo
sophical meaning —

there are two doctrines: first, th$

supposition of terms, and second, oration or discourse,
Both doctrines are universally applicable to poetry and
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The doctrine of supposition enables us to under-

stand how words are related to concepts and to things in
every form of linguistic expression.
Let us distinguish, first of all, between 'material*
and 'formal' supposition*

The supposition or substitute

value of a word considered materially merely takes it as
a thing.

.

For example, in the sentence 'Philosophers are

arrogant fools' there are four words.

If we ignore the

differences of meanings, size, spelling, position, and so
forth, of each word, and think of each word simply as it
appears, its supposition is material.

It would answer,,

the question 'what is this thing?’ by saying, 'a word'.
It is necessary to point out, however, that a
word must be used in,a proposition before it has even a
material supposition.

Hence: 'Homo est vox'j

The word

'homo' receives its material supposition by being used
in the sentence 'Homo est vox},
substituted

Any other word could be

for the word 'homo', but any word used

would in every case stand for itself (pro seipso).

But

in so doing it is no longer simply a wordj it becomes a
'term'.

And, for this reason, the supposition refers

not directly to the word itself but to its acceptance.
We ask then: 'How is this word used?' and answer: 'as
a word and nothing more',

It is quite evident, then,
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that to use a word as a word is to make it a term, a
term being, of course, part of a proposition.

Now we

are ready to define material supposition as: acceptio
termini pro seipso,^
Such use of a word has no signification^ its
function is merely representative.

The only knowledge

gained of the word is that it is part (one of the
material parts) of a proposition*
With *formal supposition*, on the contrary,
a word assumes a significative as well as a represen
tative function, for the word in this case stands in
the place of a concept which in turn signifies a thing,
A twofold division of formal supposition can now be
made: proper and improper.

In a proper supposition

something is signified either immediately or mediatelyf
immediately when a word signifies something without
first signifying something elsej

mediately when it

signifies something else first which in turn signifies
its designate*

1. For an adequate exposition of division of supposition
(suppositionis divisio) consult Joseph Gredt, O.S.B.,
Elementa Philosophiae Aiistotelico- Thomisticae, XFriebourg:
Herder' and Company, 1937) I, pp* 42“44. As fop the term
’supposition*, which translates the Latin *suppositio*,
there is really no exact equivalent in English, Perhaps
the English substitute value is sufficient to designate
•acceptio termini pro aliquo, de quo verificatur iuxta
exigentiam copulae,» ibid> p* 42,
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Proper supposition terminates a word with
reference to the thing it immediately signifies, while
improper supposition is nothing else than a metaphorical
termination,

A further division of proper supposition

can be made into simple (or logical) and real (personal).
Simple or logical supposition is the acceptance of a
term for what it immediately signifies (i.e. a concept),
while real or personal supposition gives a word a
mediate signification.
of concepts,

1

And finally, as with the division

each term, according to its supposition

has two objects which it signifies: formal or immediate
and material or mediate.

To illustrate, let us consider

the word 'man': it signifies immediately the human
nature and mediately the individual subsumed under the
species.

Proper nouns offer no special problem,

For

example, 1Peter1 signifies immediately what is signified
mediately by a common noun ’man*, and ’man' mediately
what is signified by the proper noun 'Peter’,
Now let us apply this doctrine to the distinction
we alluded to at the beginning of this chapter between
words used almost exclusively as signs and words used
almost exclusively as objects.

In strictly logical

language (to the extent that this is possible) the

1 . cf. supra p, 46,
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supposition of each word depends on the necessity,.implied
in the copula-verbs that give the total discourse.meaning.
Naturally we are dealing here with suppositions that
are for the most part logical, but which nevertheless
have an application even in the most poetic work.

The

supposition that a word receives in a poem while not
derived from the necessity imposed by the copula is
nevertheless, there, being imposed by the fiat of the
arti st,
This brings us to our discussion of oration
or discourse, and more especially of discourse for
practical purposes, (oratio ordinativa), of which
Maritain says:
i
,
(a.) There are four kinds of practical discourse
(oratio ordinativa): discourse that summons (oratio
voca'tiva) by which we move another to attention:
"Rabbi"} discourse that interrogates (oratio interrogativa)« by means of which we move him to answer:
"Ubi habitas?"} discourse that commands(oratio
imperative): "Venite et videte," by which we move
an inferior to perform some act, and discourse that
implores (oratio deprecativa): "Domine aperi nobis,"
by which we move a superior to perform an act (for
we arc unable to move our superior as such except
by the expression of pur desire). Discourse that
expresses a wish (oratio optativa) may be reduced
to oratio deprecativa.
' (b) Logic omits from its consideration not
only those four kinds of discourse, but also all
the nuances of expression which in everyday language
are mixed with enunciative discourse itself.,,in order
to make it signify not only what is, but also the
. opinion of the subject in regard to what is. In
language Logic considers purely and simply the
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expression of thought from the point of view of
the true and the false... We make use of a great
many forms of speech that express something other
than the simple identity (in re) of a Pr. and a S.,
but that is because, in these cases, these forms
of speech are themselves something other than a
simple enunciation,
In these four kinds of practical discourse
just described, it is quite evident that the purpose
of language is not to convey ideas.

It is directed

to the accomplishment of some good.

Prayer provides

us with a good example; we say to God, 'Thou art good'.
We are not informing God of something which He does not
already know.

Prayer, which is a type of discourse,

does not assert an identity.

Its purpose is not

communication, but the sanctification of the one who
prays.'

So also in poetry; the purpose is not communi

cation, but the good of the work to be done.

A poem

does not assert, then, an identity expressible in
logical language,'
It becomes clear that if logic and poetry
are confused, rhetoric, the purpose of which is to
persuade (yet without

using logical demonstrations),

is apt to usurp the province of creation.

The quarrel

between art and prudence is one of the sad results of
a confusion of art and rhetoric.

The logic of language

1, An Introduction to Logic (New York; Sheed and Ward,
1937) p p . 94-95.
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It is important that we

keep these two functions separate.

Rhetorical modes

have no place in poetry, nor has mathematical language.
The best example of the use of poetry in
language is found in the Chinese language, which throws
light on our forgotten mental processes, and thus
furnishes a new chapter in the philosophy of language.
Since poetry must appeal to the emotions with the charm
of direct impressions, the language must be direct, the
verbs concrete.

But it must also deal with spiritual

suggestions and obscure relations,

Chinese does this

by metaphor, the use of material images to suggest
immaterial relations.

Metaphor, the revealer of nature,

is the very substance of poetry; contrary to the general
belief that art and poetry deal only with the general and
abstract, they deal with the concrete of nature.

The

Chinese written language has not only absorbed the poetic
substance of nature and built with it a second world of
metaphor, but has through its very pictorial visibility,
been able to retain its original creative poetry wi,th far
more vigour and vividness than any phonetic tongue,
etymology of the word is constantly visible.

The

After

thousands of years, the lines of metaphoric advance are
still shown, and in many cases actively retained in the
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Thus a word, instead of growing poorer and poorer

as with us, grows richer and richer.
The development of the normal transitive sentence
rests upon the fact that one action in nature promotes
another; thus the agent and object are secretly verbs.

The

verbal undertone of each noun should be kept in mind when
reading Chinese poetry, for it is this activity which gives
the language its power.

The more concretely and vividly

the interaction of things is expressed, the better the
poetry; the great strentth of our language lies in the
splendid array of transitive verbs, and their recognition
of nature as a vast storehouse of forces.

It is for this

reason that Shakespeare is considered one of the finest
of English poets: his persistent use of hundreds of tran
sitive verbs, with rarely an ’is 1 or 'are*, give his work
a vitality seldom equalled by poets in the English language.
The poet can never feel or see too much.

His

metaphors are only ways of overcoming the lifeless copula.
The ability of poetry to surpass prose in beauty and
picturesqueness is due in particular to the poet's selection
from juxtaposition of those words whose overtones blend
into a delicate and lucid harmony.

All arts follow the

same law: refined harmony lies in the delicate balance of
overtones.
Let us take for example the Chinese line: 'The
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sun rises in the east*:

0
7T
Here the wealth of composition in characters makes possible
a choice of words in which a single dominant overtone
colours every plane of meaning; that is perhaps the most
conspicuous quality of Chinese poetry.

The sun on one

side, on the other the sign of the east, the sun entangled
in the branches of a tree.

And in the middle sign, the

verb ’rise’, the sun is above the horizon, but beyond that
the single upright line is like the growing trunk.
The Chinese language is almost unique in this
extraordinary ability to lend itself so completely to
poetic expression.

In other languages, as we have pointed

out, the poet is handicapped by the weakness and turbidity
of a medium of expression which frequently proves a
hindrance to his art.
Le Poete est
Qui hante la
Exile sur le
Ses ailes de

In the words of Baudelaire:

semblable au prince des nu^es
tempete et se rit de l’archei?;
sol au milieu des huees,
geant l ’empechent de marcher.
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(a)

An intellectual sense of mystery (ens mysterium) is
indispensable in coth metaphysics and poetry.
The word •mystery' in its original meaning was
religious and theological. No apology is required for the
appropriation of the word by philosophers or by poets. Ens
mysterium. like theobject of faith, is transcendental. The
order reflected in the soul of the poet and made known by
his poem is also transcendental, A brief history of the
word and a few explanatory notes should make this clear.
The word 'mystery* itself has had a long and
interesting history* The use made of it by the ancients,
the Greeks and the Romans (mysterium) was principally
religious. Generally it designated a secret service or
rite that was performed in connection with the worship of
a deity.^ This was the first meaning of the word. The
idea of secrecy was closely associated with its meaning:
In addition to the public festivals, there were certain
secret and mysterious rites performed in honour of
particular deities. The most famous of these were the
secret rites performed in honor of Demeter and her
daughter Persephone at Eleusis, and known as the
Eleusian Mysteries,^
In his De Natura Deorum-^ Cicero uses the word in
practically the same sense. The notes of secrecy and sacred
ness are retained:
Suscepit autem vita hominua consuetudoque communis ut
beneficiis excellentis viros in caelum fama ac voluntate
tollerent. Hinc Hercules hinc Castor et Pollux hinc
Aesculapius hinc Lifeer etiam (hunc dico Liberum Semela
natum, non eum quem nostri maiores auguste sancteque
(Liberum) cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt, quod
quale sit ex mysteriis intellegi potest...
Another meaning in the Latin form of the word is
seen among the Christians. With them it designates principally
something transcending mere human intelligence. The Vulgate
1. The Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, 1933),
Vol. VI, p. 815 bff.
2. C. E, Smith and P. G. Moorhead, A Short History of the Ancient
World (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 'inc., 1939)pp. 1A3_144.
3. Cicero, De Natura Deorum (H. Rackham) (London: William Heinemann,
1933) II, xxiv, 62, p. 182.
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speaks of the mysterium^ evyigelii. mysteria regni caelorum.
and mysterium iniquitatis,
These excellent examples indicate
the changed meaning of the word with the Christians, The
emphasis has shifted from 'secrecy1 to 'transcendence', or at
least to transcendence with regard to the human intelligence.
In these three examples the intellectual content of faith
(fides) in the Pauline sense iB indicated. But now the note
of 'vision' is added. Saint Paul defined faith as 'Thd substance
of things hoped for, a certification of things not seen.1 In
the Vulgate this appears as follows:
Est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argu
menturn non apparentium.2
Faith is a cognitive virtue, an intellectual habitus
which perfects the mind in its knowledge of resealed truth.
Assent is given to a proposition without its being proved.
This explains the second part of the definition, 'a certification
of things not seen*. Here we have the elements necessary for
mystery: in one sense the mysterium fidei is grasped by the
intellect and in another it is not. The clear-obscure vision^
of things unseen implies no contradiction because 'things not
seen' are not seen by the light of human reason (or philo
sophically) but by the highest light, viz., the authority of
God revealing.
The mysterium fidei thus contains the notes of
'sacredness', 'transcendence' and 'vision'. The last note,
perhaps needs some explanation. The object of faith according
to Saint Paul and Thomas Aquinas, is not something demonstrable,
that is, a knowledge which can be reduced to first principles
which are self-evident.^- Nevertheless the light of faith
(lumen fidei) causes those things which are believed to be
seen: Dicendum quod lumen fidei facit videre ea quae
creduntur.5
1. Eph. 6-19; Matt. 13-11; 2 Thess. 2-7.
2. Bibliorum Sacrorum iuxta vulgatam clementinam (Typis Poly
glottis Vaticanis, Mediolanensis, 1913.) p. 1122.
3. vide Garrigou-Lagrange, Le sens du mystere et le clair-obscur
intellectuel (Paris: Desilee de Brouwer, 1934) p p . 134-156.
4. Thomas Aquinas, SumlTheol. (Ottawa Edition, Ottawa, Canada,
1941) II-II, 1.4.c.
5. loc.cit. ad 3.
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1?o believe does not involve a reduction to first principles
but an election on the part of the will moved by thevsuper
natural lumen fidei to assent intellectually to a given
proposition, e.g., Christ and the mystical body of the
Church are one#

A third meaning might be called 1sacramental1, where
for instance mysterium fidei designates the Lord's Supper.^* * * * * * $ $ $

Now let us see what notes are involved in ens
mysterium. the object of metaphysics; here we are dealing
with a natural lumen, the light of the human intellect#
The first point to be considered here is that the human
intellect is finite. Its power to grasp its natural
object (which is being) is, therefore, limited, being
dependent on what it has received as a created essence#
The second point is that it confronts three orders: one
which is above it, the superior order; a- second order which
is bdlow it, the inferior order; and a third which is
connatural with it. Hence, we have the human intellect con
sidering divine things, things that pertain to God, that
are at once 'sacred1 and *transcendent*• Me have also the
human intellect considering nature in the particular sciences.
And finally we have man considering himself and those objects
connatural to him#
Denial of mystery involves a confusion of orders:
1# A confusion of the superior with the connatural or
2# A confusion of the inferior with the connatural. A
third confusion is possible, the inferior with the superior.
As Garrigou-Lagrange points out, there are two fundamental
errors that eliminate mystery from metaphysics, namely,
spiritualism and materialism. ^
Into these two categories
most of the moderns can be classified# The prime example
of spiritualism is Deseartes, who explained the inferior
in terms of the superior.*
1. vide A New Latin Dictionary. Louis and Short, American
Book Co., New York: 190?) pp. 1183, c.
2#

Garrigou-Lagrange, op. cit.. p. 134 n5.

3*

ibid.. p. 106.
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M Maritain* s statement on the nature of mystery in
Sept Lemons sur 1'Etre provides us with a full explanation
on how the term is used in metaphysics:
Suivant une terminologie que j*emprunte k un
philosophe franqais cdntemporain, M Gabriel Marcel,—
mais que j*applique, It vrai dire, d'une faqon tout k
fait diffirente,— disons que toute question posde
par une science prdsente un double aspect. L*aspect
mystere. et 1*aspect problVme* G*est un mystbre et
c'est un problbme; un 'mystbre* du cot6 de la chose,
de l'objet et de sa rdality extramentale; un 'problbme'
du cotd de nos formules.
La notion de mystbre intelligible n*est pas une
notion contradictoire, c'est la plus exacte faqon de
designer la realite; le mystbre n'est pas 1'ennemi,
1'adversaire de 1'intelligence, c'est Descartes et la
raison cartesienne qui ont introduit eette opposition
menteuse,— opposition du rest inevitable en systbme
idealists, en climat iddaliste. L*objectivity de
1* intelligence est elle-mbme souverainement nysterieuse;
et l'objet de la connaissance, c'est le 'mystbre' amend
& l'dtat d'intelligibility en acte et d'intellection en
acte: elle devient 1*autre en tant qu*autrej elle amene
au sein d'elle-ineme une realitd indpuisable ("transobjective") vitalement saisi comme objet. L'objet^
c'est le rdel lui-meme.*
The sacramental meaning of mystery is in no sense sacrificed
in this explanation by M Maritain* The sacramental character
of the universi is indispensable in a metaphysics whieh claims
to be true*

1* Jacques Maritain, Sept Lecons sur L'Etre (Paris: Chez Pierre
Tdqui, 1933) pp. 8-9*
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